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The Case of The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction: Deconstruction, 
Psychoanalysis, Childhood, Animality. 
KARíN LESNIK-OBERSTEIN 
Jacqueline Rose argued in her foundational 1984 book on psychoanalysis and children’s 
literature, The Case of Peter Pan or: The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction,1 that children’s 
literature and its criticism are necessarily produced by one self-defined identity - adults - on 
behalf of a defined ‘other’ - the child. However, this is emphatically not because Rose is 
arguing – as has been widely assumed2 – that adults colonise, dominate, idealise or impose an 
identity on children. This assumption rests on the view of a common-sensical,3 real world in 
which there are adults and children and where these adults might or might not allow the 
children differing degrees of freedom, agency, voice or authenticity. But psychoanalysis as 
understood by Rose offers a radical set of questions of such a common-sensical, real-world 
view of adults and children as separate, autonomous, physical bodies in a material world, 
however diverse and differentiated such adults and children might be seen to be.  
Instead, Rose’s interpretations of psychoanalysis are deeply interested in considering the 
profound implications of memory for this ‘real world’ and the adults and children supposedly 
know-able as such within it: for, as Freud argued, psychoanalysis children and childhood can 
only ever be known as such through memory. As he writes in the ‘Preface to the Fourth 
Edition’ to ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’: ‘If mankind had been able to learn 
from a direct observation of children, these three essays could have remained unwritten.’4 
Key here is Freud’s claim of ‘direct observation’ as a problem for learning about children, for 
even ‘observation’ is here subject to memory – observation cannot be ‘direct’ in the sense 
that it is always itself a retrospectively remembered ‘observation’. But, going even further 
than this, memory for Freud is not conceived of as a set of chronological events that may or 
may not be recalled correctly, but instead memory is conceived of as what a person is (what 
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our account of ourselves is), without having the options of ‘accurately’ or ‘inaccurately’ 
remembering ourselves.  
This is not, as is often feared, a nihilist or relativist position: it is not about saying that 
psychoanalysis makes the real world, materiality and the child somehow evaporate or that it 
relegates children to some position of absolute passivity or that psychoanalysis does not 
believe that people can lie about their memories or invent untrue memories. Instead, 
psychoanalysis is for Freud and Rose centrally interested in how childhood, but also any 
‘identity’, is about how we are seen and defined in differing, shifting, perspectives in which 
how we see what we see is determined by our own interests, beliefs and investments. This is 
also where psychoanalytic and deconstructive thinking about the child meet in that for both 
this is, however, not something we necessarily know about ourselves: we cannot know our 
own perspective as a ‘choice’, but instead these perspectives constitute who we are both to 
ourselves and others.  
As Derrida writes: 
man calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other from the play of 
supplementarity; the purity of nature, of animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, 
divinity. The approach to these limits is at once feared as a threat of death and desired 
as access to a life without différance. The history of man calling himself man is the 
articulation of all these limits among themselves. All concepts determining a non-
supplementarity (nature, animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity, etc.) 
have evidently no truth-value (…) They have a meaning only within a closure of the 
game.5  
Neither perspectives nor the others defined by them, then, can be stable or unitary, 
because, as Rose argues, psychoanalysis disrupts the very grounds for the ‘discussions of 
children’s fiction (in which) childhood is part of a strict developmental sequence at the 
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end of which stands the cohered and rational consciousness of the adult mind.’6 Derrida 
argues similarly that settling on any certain knowledge of the animal, even of animals as 
various, ‘would mean forgetting all the signs I have sought to give, tirelessly, of my 
attention to difference, to differences, to heterogeneities, and abyssal ruptures as against 
the homogenous and the continuous.’7 Instead, both for Rose and Derrida, that ‘adult 
mind’ too is divided in terms of ‘the unconscious (which) is not an object, something to be 
laid hold of and retrieved. It is the term which Freud used to describe the complex ways in 
which our very idea of ourselves as children is produced.’8 
Rose, like Freud and Derrida, reads the investment in childhood (as well as any other 
‘object’ or ‘identity’ claimed as known or knowable by others, including animals and the 
(post-)human) as the desire for a ‘real’ which defeats language and the unconscious in 
claiming that it can know objects and others ‘objectively’ and apart from itself, including the 
child: 
Children’s fiction rests on the idea that there is a child who is simply there to be 
addressed and that speaking to it might be simple. (…) Peter Pan stands in our culture 
as a monument to the impossibility of its own claims – that it represents the child, 
speaks to and for children, addresses them as a group which is knowable and exists for 
the book, much as the book (so the claim runs) exists for them. (…) Children’s 
literature is impossible, not in the sense that it cannot be written (that would be 
nonsense), but that it hangs on an impossibility of which it rarely ventures to speak. 
This is the impossible relation between adult and child. 9 
Rose made this argument now more than thirty years ago but David Rudd and Antony Pavlik, 
the editors of the 2010 special issue of the Children’s Literature Association Quarterly to 
mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of The Case of Peter Pan, noted then in 
their introduction that in children’s literature studies ‘references to Rose’s work are, more 
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often than not, en passant and once made, the critic then proceeds as though it were “business 
as usual.”’10 The special issue contributions themselves however, to my reading, also ‘then 
(proceed) as though it were “business as usual”’, even where overtly claiming to be in 
agreement with Rose. I will argue in this article how and why that is, however, necessarily 
and always the case because, as Rose’s own subtitle The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction 
claims, her understandings of psychoanalysis are in and of themselves incompatible with the 
liberal humanist groundings and aims of ‘children’s literature’ which assume themselves to 
be in the ‘real world’ I described above. This is not because, as Rose stresses herself, she is 
claiming that it is ‘impossible’ to write or read children’s books, but because psychoanalysis 
has a completely different view to children’s literature criticism of what ‘writing’ and 
‘reading’ (language) are about and what they can ‘do’, whether to or for ‘children’ or 
anybody else. 
I will demonstrate my arguments here in relation to my own and others’ readings of a 
picture book, Jessica Love’s Julián is a Mermaid,11 not because this book has any particularly 
unique bearing on the case of The Case of Peter Pan, but precisely because I am here making 
a case, as Rose was in her arguments about Peter Pan: at issue is not primarily Peter Pan or 
Julián is a Mermaid as having a unique or especially relevant ‘content’ but as read in relation 
to the structural claims of all ‘children’s literature (criticism)’. Jacques Derrida writes in 
relation to this in The Truth in Painting:  
The passe-partout which here creates an event must not pass for a master key. You will 
not be able to pass it from hand to hand like a convenient instrument, a short treatise, a 
viaticum or even an organon or pocket canon, in short a transcendental pass, a 
password to open all doors, decipher all texts and keep their chains under surveillance. 
If you rushed to understand it in this way, I would have to issue a warning 
(avertissement): this forward [sic] (avertissement) is not a passe-partout.12  
5 
 
For Derrida, in other words, deconstruction and the truth in painting – the truth in picture 
books – is not about methods of reading to achieve known and pre-determined results 
discussing characters, themes, plots, contexts, issues, messages and ideologies; not about the 
‘what’ of texts and paintings (or pictures or anything else), but the how. In my deconstructive 
and psychoanalytic reading of Julián is a Mermaid the consequences will therefore in any 
case not be children’s literature (criticism) as it recognises itself and is recognised by others. 
Something other is at stake in such readings for the psychoanalysis for which, as Rose writes:  
Deception is (…) the very order of language. (…) Language is not something we 
simply use to communicate, as everything in psychoanalytic practice makes clear. 
Psychoanalysis directs its attention to what cannot be spoken in what is actually being 
said. It starts from the assumption that there is a difficulty in language (…) But the 
problem of language – the idea that language might be a problem – is the dimension of 
psychoanalysis that has been most rigorously avoided in discussions of fiction for the 
child.13
Linda Sue Park, in The New York Times sums up Julián is a Mermaid as follows: 
In the introductory spread, Julián, who seems about 6, is swimming with several 
abuelas [Nanas]14 all wearing bathing caps and fond, watchful gazes. Then we see 
Julián and his abuela on the subway, where the other passengers include three splendid 
mermaids. Are they figments of Julián’s imagination? The text gives no hint: “This is a 
boy named Julián,” we read. “And this is his abuela. And those are some mermaids.” 
On closer examination the mermaids have feet and wear sandals. Three wordless 
spreads follow, in which Julián imagines frolicking in the ocean with dreamlike sea 
creatures. Once home, Julián uses household items (a curtain, ferns from a planter) to 
garb himself as a mermaid. When his abuela catches him, she turns her back, only to 
return with a gift. 
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(…) In the joyous conclusion, the pair make their way to a mermaid parade (an annual 
event at Coney Island in Brooklyn) and join the spectacle. The final illustration shows 
the abuelas from the first spread, transformed into mermaids. Alongside Julián, readers 
learn that anyone can be a mermaid: All it takes is love and acceptance, a little 
imagination and a big swishy tail.15 
Some other critics concur with this positive assessment: for Maria Popova, the book is ‘a 
sweet story of loving acceptance and the jubilant inner transformation that takes place when 
one is welcomed to be and to dream beyond society’s narrow templates of being and 
dreaming’,16 while for Elizabeth Bird: 
Julián begins to imagine himself as a mermaid (… but c)aught by his grandmother he’s 
unsure of how to feel. That is, until she leads him by the hand to the Coney Island 
Mermaid Parade. They join the throng and Julián knows he belongs. With minimal 
language and an abundance of love, the author/illustrator gives everyone with a 
mermaid inside of them a tale of sweet, near speechless belonging.17 
There have also been more critical views of the text, notably in relation to issues of 
gender, sexual and ethnic identities, for instance in the review of Laura Jiménez:  
for me, I keep looking at this book and I don’t think it is about a trans girl, or a gender 
fluid kid. It is really about a boy dressing up as a mermaid. Stacy Collins very aptly 
pointed out, “A fish tail is not inherently feminine, unless Julián wants it to be.”  
And, that is an issue I keep running into with this book. It isn’t clear what, if anything, 
Julián wants to express because this isn’t really Julián’s story. It is Jessica Love’s story, 
a story of a young Dominican boy, playing dress up or constructing himself (sic), as 
imagined by a White, cis woman who brings her identity to the work, and with her 
identity comes her outsider’s gaze. 
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And, I think that is what bothers me the most. It isn’t JUST that Jessica Love isn’t a 
trans person of color. It is that there is nowhere in the book where I am not aware that 
this is another book about looking AT a trans body. 18  
I want to consider here first of all that although there are distinctive and important differences 
between the positive and the more critical reviews, nevertheless they are in fact all founded 
on the same ways of thinking about childhood, gender, sexuality and ethnicity: staying for the 
moment within the parameters of children’s literature criticism, in all these reviews Julián is 
on the one hand seen and defined in the perspective of another, in, for instance: ‘as imagined 
by a White, cis woman’, ‘Julián, who seems about 6’, ‘we see Julián’, ‘Julián uses household 
items’, but on the other hand ‘Julián’ is claimed, for instance, to ‘imagine’, ‘be’, ‘dream’, 
‘feel’, ‘know’, ‘want to express’ and ‘belong’. In such a reading, we, the readers, learn 
something about how those who are not themselves ‘Julián’ see, think about, and look at 
‘Julián’, but we also learn about how ‘Julián’ himself (sic)19 imagines, is, wants, dreams, 
feels, knows and belongs. But if I shift to a psychoanalytic and deconstructive reading, then 
there is no ‘on the one hand’ and ‘on the other hand’: instead, I read all the claims as a 
perspective on ‘Julián’, not as a suppression of a ‘Julián’ that is there, now ignored or over-
ruled, but because any ‘Julián’ (or anything) is constituted psychoanalytically and 
deconstructively speaking from elsewhere, to begin with as a past (retrospection); a 
production of memory, as all texts are retrospectively narrated. Equally, in the pictures I can 
see ‘Julián’, which for this kind of reading entails that this cannot be ‘Julián’s’ own view, but 
only a perspective on him from elsewhere. I will also be considering here ongoingly what it 
even means for me to claim that ‘I can see “Julián”’ in the pictures, for how do I read what 
‘Julián’ there is to be seen as such? As Derrida writes:  
The signatory promises, it seems to ‘say’ in painting, by painting the truth and even, if 
you like, the truth in painting (…) We have not got to the end of this speech act 
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promising perhaps a painting act. With this verbal promise, this performative which 
does not describe anything, (the painter) does something, as much as and more than he 
says. But in doing so he promises that he will say the truth in painting. (…) the allegory 
of truth in painting is far from offering itself completely naked on a canvas.20  
In other words: no matter what I write about my reading of Julián is a Mermaid’s text or 
pictures, it cannot be somehow the text or pictures ‘themselves’, ‘naked on a canvas’, but 
is already my ‘writing’, also as my ‘writing’ of ‘reading’ and ‘writing’. 
The consequences of such a shift are, then, profound: I cannot claim a knowledge of 
‘Julián’ as somehow emanating from himself directly, spontaneously, authentically, 
constituting a superior, ‘true’, knowledge to that knowledge which was claimed as not his 
‘own’ view but that of someone else, to whom ‘Julián’ ‘seems about 6’, or those ‘we’ who 
‘see Julián’ or know that he ‘uses household items’. Neither can there be an author whose 
experiences and identities could guarantee such a superior, ‘true’, knowledge by, for instance, 
not being ‘White, cis’ but instead themselves also a ‘trans person of color’.  Instead, my 
reading is necessarily now about how perspectives make all the claims about ‘Julián’ and 
how that constitutes those perspectives themselves, as much as reading within the parameters 
of children’s literature criticism is after all the only way children’s literature critics – working 
within their parameters - can read.21 For this different reading, Derrida argues:  
And if you bide your time awhile here in these pages, you would discover that I cannot 
dominate the situation, or translate it, or describe it. I cannot report what is going on in 
it, or narrate it, or depict it, or pronounce or mimic it, or offer it up to be read or 
formalized without remainder.22 
In other words, as I explained above, reading psychoanalytically and deconstructively 
cannot deliver results that ‘make sense’ for children’s literature critics: for both Rose and 
Derrida, it cannot deliver the child ‘without remainder’.  
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This also, therefore, poses specific challenges to the positive reviews’ conclusions 
that ‘(a)longside Julián, readers learn that anyone can be a mermaid’, or about ‘the jubilant 
inner transformation that takes place when one is welcomed to be and to dream beyond 
society’s narrow templates of being and dreaming’, or that ‘the author/ illustrator gives 
everyone with a mermaid inside of them a tale of sweet, near speechless belonging’, but 
equally so to the critical review’s knowledge of what a ‘fish tail’, ‘a mermaid’ or a ‘trans 
body’ are. To begin with, all these perspectives know23 here what a ‘mermaid’ is and is not. 
Critic Robbie Voss claims that for Derrida the mermaid is inherently ‘undecidable’ because 
she is ‘both woman and fish, human and animal’, but being known to be ‘both’ does not, in 
Derrida’s arguments, constitute ‘undecidability’ as the ‘woman’, ‘fish’, ‘human’ and ‘animal’ 
are after all each decidedly distinguished and known as such in Voss’s claims.24 Instead, I 
read that according to the reviews’ perspectives, neither ‘Julián’ nor ‘readers’ are ‘mermaids’, 
as they have to ‘learn that anyone can be a mermaid’, where ‘anyone’ are also something 
different from ‘mermaids’ as they ‘can be a mermaid’ (my italics) but therefore are also 
known not always to be able to be. Similarly, ‘the author/ illustrator’ and ‘everyone’ are 
different from ‘mermaids’, although ‘everyone’ is divided up into those that do and those that 
do not – ‘with’ – ‘a mermaid inside of them’, where  ‘everyone’ is known as something more 
than and other to, a mermaid. The ‘everyone’ is also a ‘them’, so that this perspective does 
not include itself in the ‘everyone’ that is ‘given (…) a tale of sweet, near speechless 
belonging’, although it does know about the ‘tale’ without having been ‘given’ it. In any case, 
those ‘with a mermaid inside of them’ are known not have this ‘tale’ to begin with as it must 
be ‘given’ to them by the ‘author/ illustrator’. Finally, what is ‘given’ to ‘everyone’ is ‘a tale’ 




In the case of ‘the jubilant inner transformation’, this is known only to take place 
subject to ‘when one is welcomed’, so that the perspective here is different from the ‘one’ in 
knowing already to have been ‘welcomed’ itself and in knowing that it is already beyond 
‘society’s narrow templates of being and dreaming’. The perspective also does still ‘be and 
dream’, however, so that ‘being and dreaming’ are not themselves ‘narrow templates’. The 
welcoming is from where the perspective is already – ‘beyond’, as well as being known by 
the perspective to be prior to itself in order for it to know that it has already been ‘welcomed’. 
Paradoxically, this entails that the prior of ‘welcoming’ is within the perspective nevertheless 
in order to be known as such. The ‘one’, however, is initially still within ‘society’s narrow 
templates’ and without ‘the jubilant inner transformation’. The ‘inner transformation’ is also 
known from elsewhere, despite its being ‘inner’ and is known too therefore to be different 
from an ‘outer transformation’, although this also entails an inevitable collapse of ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ in both being able to be known to be a ‘transformation’ that can take, or has taken, 
place. 
 Being or becoming (in part) a mermaid here is about a belonging which apparently is 
to do with ‘joyous’, ‘jubilant inner transformation’ and also ‘love’. In a very general sense, 
this could be read to be about a liberation from ‘society’s narrow templates’ by a perspective 
which already knows itself to be liberated and this may be connected to how this book is 
rated highly in several LGBTQ+ reviews and blogs, including being awarded the 2019 
Stonewall Book Award.25 The author, Jessica Love, is quoted by Josh Jackman on the 
website PinkNews as saying: 
There’s something about mermaids. Who knows if that’s because they’re magical 
creatures who can live between two realities or because they don’t have any genitals, or 
because they’re f***ing great. 
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But as soon as I noticed that, I was like: ‘Oh my god, there’s a parade in New York 
every summer called The Coney Island Mermaid Parade. 
This is claimed to be also about ‘gender questioning children’ and for ‘kids (…) like 
Julian’.26 Liberation through belonging here is known then to be about a difference, but it is 
also an already known and specific difference: in the case in Love’s comments as quoted by 
Jackman the difference is ‘something about’ mermaids – not mermaids themselves – and that 
‘something about’ is governed (‘if’) by one or more of three options: ‘magical creatures who 
can live between two realities’, ‘don’t have any genitals’, ‘or because they’re fu***ing great’, 
but in any case none of this was ‘noticed’ initially. Love explains that she only ‘noticed’ this 
when ‘I was reading all these parenting blogs and this theme of mermaids is a thread that runs 
through so many of these different kids’ experiences’.27 Here too, Love knows the ‘kids’ not 
to be mermaids, but in any case to be ‘different’, although they all are known in Love’s 
reading of the ‘parenting blogs’ to be ‘kids’ nonetheless and to have ‘experiences’. The 
connection Love makes according to Jackman between ‘gender questioning children’, ‘kids 
(…) like Julián’ and ‘mermaids’ is that ‘something about’, whereby ‘gender questioning’ is 
then apparently about being ‘magical creatures who can live between two realities’, or not 
having ‘any genitals’ or ‘because they’re f***ing great’, none of which, however, is actually 
seen to be the case for the ‘gender questioning children’ or ‘different kids’ as they are known 
to be ‘children’ and  ‘kids’ and not ‘mermaids’. 
‘Gender questioning children’ and ‘different kids’ are known by Love therefore to 
know that they are not themselves ‘magical creatures who can live between two realities’, to 
know that they have ‘genitals’ and are also known possibly (‘who knows if?’) to regret this 
about themselves in finding the mermaids to be ‘f***ing great’ in these respects. According 
to Jackman, Love ‘says that she hopes to convey the message to trans children that “you’re 
loved. You’re beautiful. You are loved”’, whereby ‘trans children’ presumably not only are 
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thought not initially already to know (sufficiently) that they are loved or beautiful but are also 
part of the ‘different kids’ and ‘gender questioning children’ who are not ‘magical creatures 
who can live between two realities’ and who do ‘have any genitals’.28 ‘Children’ can here 
‘question’ ‘gender’ but can also be ‘trans’, which are apparently not the same thing. In order 
to ‘question’ ‘gender’ the ‘children’ must be known to know about it, however, from a 
position that is other to ‘gender’, but they are not known to question ‘child’, for instance – 
making ‘child’ an identity apart from and prior to ‘gender’, with ‘gender’ only to be 
questioned. Being a ‘magical creature’ is in this perspective known by the children to be able 
to be and do something else they cannot do either, which is ‘live between two realities’, so 
that the children are known to know that they do live either in ‘two realities’ or in one or the 
other of the two, where the ‘between’ is not itself a reality.  
In the case of ‘trans children’, they are also known neither to question ‘child’ nor 
‘trans’ but simply to be so. If one aspect of this is claimed to be an aspiration not to ‘have any 
genitals’, then this implies that there is a knowledge that the (trans) children too know that 
they do ‘have any genitals’. Does this imply that according to the perspective being a ‘trans 
child’ or a ‘gender questioning child’ is about wanting no longer to have the genitals that they 
know they have? Are ‘any genitals’ known to be the site of ‘questioning gender’ or being 
‘trans’ for children? Are ‘any genitals’ ‘gender’? Is the aspiration not to ‘have any genitals’ 
‘trans’? If it may seem from current, wide-spread discussions both academic and popular that 
‘gender questioning’ and ‘trans’ are – common-sensically - precisely about ‘genitals’, then 
the question from a psychoanalytic and deconstructive perspective is precisely: how and 
why? As leading theorist of transexuality (sic) David Valentine, writes: 
the meanings and values attached to genitals retain a primacy of reference. To put it 
another way, non-transexual genitals (and other parts of the non-transexual male and 
female body that index sex/ gender) are rich with signification, carrying far more 
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meaning than they can bearand most importantly, they carry the meaning of the natural 
and the original.29 
In other words, neither psychoanalysis nor deconstruction nor Valentine accept that ‘genitals’ 
are ‘literal’: that they determine being a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’ or ‘trans’ or ‘non-trans’ 
somehow in and of themselves or that they could even be a ‘themselves’. Instead, for 
Valentine, ‘genitals’ are about ‘signification’, ‘the meaning of the natural and the original’. 
Concerned with this issue are also the very frequently assumed differences between ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’: if, as Valentine argues, ‘sex/ gender’ is ‘indexed’ by ‘non-transexual genitals and 
other parts of the non-transexual male and female body’ then this does not permit ‘sex’ to be 
a ‘literal’ with ‘gender’ as a ‘figurative’ or ‘symbolic’. This also connects to Love’s claims 
about the ‘trans’ and ‘gender questioning’ children, for if the children are all known to know 
they ‘have any genitals’ then ‘genitals’ are here claimed to be the same in being ‘any 
genitals’ at all. At the same time, ‘gender’ is known not to be about ‘any genitals’, as 
‘gender’ is ‘questioned’ while ‘any genitals’ are either had or not had, but in any case not, 
here, ‘questioned’ even as the children are known not to want to have them but to be 
mermaids – who don’t - instead. As Daniel Monk argues in reading childhood in relation to 
homophobic bullying and campaigns against such bullying: 
The acknowledgement of homophobic bullying could suggest that that there is a space 
for including LGBT youth within the category of legitimate childhood. But it is 
important to explore the conditions of this inclusion. One of these ‘conditions’ appears 
to be that queer youth conforms to the cultural definitions of innocent (and ideally non-
sexual) childhood.30   
 , Reading both childhood and trans(gender) in perspective, retrospectively, according 
to Rose and Derrida’s arguments, Julián is not claimed to be either a ‘gender questioning’ nor 
a ‘trans’ child in Julián is a Mermaid, nor, as I already wrote above, can I read Julián to be a 
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mermaid (although for different reasons and with different consequences than in the critical 
review of Jiminéz), despite the title’s claim that ‘Julián is a mermaid’. First, the title claim 
relies on a (necessarily retrospectively) known difference between ‘Julián’ and ‘mermaid’ in 
order to claim that one ‘is’ the other. To my reading, this has to do with the knowledge that 
‘This is a boy named Julián (…) And those are some mermaids’, 31 so that ‘Julián’ is only 
how ‘this boy’ is known to be ‘named’ by others. ‘This boy’ too is ‘this’ in being known to 
be one of other ‘boys’ and it is ‘this boy’ but ‘those are some mermaids’, so that the boy and 
the mermaids are each known to be in a different relation to the perspective. In the picture, I 
read ‘this (…) boy named Julián. And this is his abuela’ to be about a difference in frame: 
‘this’ is in a different frame to ‘those’ and when ‘this’ and ‘those’ in the next picture are 
instead within the same frame, ‘Julián LOVES mermaids’.32 Being within the same frame 
seems, then, to be about the difference between what the perspective claims it sees itself and 
what it claims it knows Julián to see and ‘LOVE’, although in both pictures I see Julián, so 
that it cannot be my seeing of his seeing or his ‘LOVE’, but only about the perspectives’ shift 
in claims in terms of what it knows about Julián. Again, as I have explained previously, this 
is not about a loss of ‘agency’ or ‘authenticity’ of the child: the consequence of 
psychoanalytic and deconstructive reading is that the ‘child’s’ vision or feelings or 
knowledge are not available in and of themselves as themselves, but instead are always a 
claim from elsewhere, in order even to known what ‘a child’s vision’ is.  
 I take Linda Sue Park in her review to be surprised by something to do with ‘those 
(…) mermaids’ as she writes that ‘On closer examination the mermaids have feet and wear 
sandals.’ If this is indeed a surprise ‘on closer examination’, then for Park it is not what 
‘mermaids’ are expected to have; instead, they should have ‘a big swishy tail.’33 The having 
of ‘feet and wear(ing) sandals’ instead of ‘a big swishy tail’ may also be due to ‘mermaids’ 
being something ‘three mesmerizing women’ are ‘dressed up as’,34 or that Julián ‘garb(s) 
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himself as a mermaid’,35 or that there is the ‘The Coney Island Mermaid Parade’.36 Even 
Park’s triumphant conclusion that ‘The final illustration shows the abuelas from the first 
spread, transformed into mermaids’ I can read in terms of the ‘abuelas’’ ‘transformation into 
mermaids’ being about their bathing costumes now including a ‘large swishy tail’ as the 
‘tails’ are of the same pattern as the bathing costumes in the ‘introductory spread’.37 This is 
not about my wanting to claim that the abuelas in the final illustration are not really 
mermaids but also ‘just’ ‘dressed up’  (compare also the claim of Jiminéz that it ‘is really 
about a boy dressing up as a mermaid’), but instead to consider what it means to read 
‘mermaids’ (but also anything else) here as ‘real’ or as ‘dressed up’? And how is this 
constituted as a ‘transformation’? Is a ‘large swishy tail’ which is a repetition of the pattern of 
the bathing suits either a ‘cover’ over something else ‘underneath’ (‘dressed up’) or ‘the 
mermaid body’ itself? What kind of reading does this both rely on and produce? (How) does 
this, for instance, have anything to do with Jackman’s claim that for Love being a mermaid 
has to do with not ‘having any genitals’? Are the genitals ‘dressed up’ because they are 
known still to be present ‘underneath’? Or are ‘any genitals’ removed or replaced by ‘the big 
swishy tail’? Is that what the ‘transformation’ is? How would I know about any of this? 
Where and how can I read this in Julián is a Mermaid?  
What about, for instance, the smaller mermaid at the bottom of ‘the final illustration’? 
Its ‘tail’ is the only one which is not a repetition of the patterns of the bathing suits in the 
introductory spread. This instead looks to me as the same mermaid as the one that I see on 
pages 4-5, which Linda Sue Park takes to be the final one of the ‘Three wordless spreads 
(which) follow, in which Julián imagines frolicking in the ocean with dreamlike sea 
creatures’ and which Elizabeth Bird considers, similarly, as part of ‘Julián begins to imagine 
himself as a mermaid’. This may also be the ‘dreaming’ of which Popova writes.38 The tropes 
of the child’s ‘imagination’ and ‘dream’ are perhaps some of the most persistent and 
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prevalent in Western Romantic and post-Romantic constructions of childhood. Yet again, the 
reviewers’ - and children’s literature critics’ – claims that these are Julián’s ‘own’ 
‘imagination’ and ‘dream’ cannot be read as such in psychoanalytic and deconstructive 
readings: instead, what is at stake for the perspective of the ‘three wordless spreads’? First, 
the three spreads are between Julián and ‘his abuela’ being on the subway and leaving it on p. 
9 when ‘his abuela’ is claimed to say ‘Let’s go, honey. This is our stop’. In the first ‘wordless 
spread’ (pp. 3-4) I can see a subway window frame some urban apartment buildings but with 
a green wash of colour splashes also within the frame with the buildings. The green wash and 
splashes of colour also are in most of the rest of page 3 and all of page 4, 5 and 6 and much of 
pages 7 and 8 as well as most but not all of the ‘introductory spread’ and all of the ‘final 
illustration’ and are different from the colours of the rest of the pages of the book. The 
‘introductory spread’, pages 17-18 and the ‘final illustration’ do not have words either, 
although this is not mentioned by Park, so that perhaps for Park the ‘wordlessness’ of the 
‘three spreads’ is somehow different to spreads that do not have words: there are what Park 
calls the ‘dreamlike sea creatures’ in ‘the three wordless spreads’ although not in the other 
spreads that do not have words, so that ‘imagination’ and ‘dream’ can be constituted for Park 
as ‘wordless’ when words are known to be lacking, so that, paradoxically, their lack is here a 
gain if the imagination and dream are claimed to lead to Julián to ‘think(ing) of (…) 
becoming a mermaid himself’.39   
But ‘(B)ecoming a mermaid himself’ is something that is known to be ‘all he can 
think of’, according to the back cover blurb, differently to the ‘Julián imagines’ or ‘begins to 
imagine’ of Park and Bird. Also, when Julián ‘garbs himself as a mermaid’40 this is ‘Julián 
has an idea’ (p. 15) which is therefore not Julián’s ‘own’ idea, but what is claimed to be 
known about Julián and what an ‘idea’ is from elsewhere. In the pictures, the removal of 
sandals, shirt and shorts and the addition of fern, flowers, lip-stick and curtains are known to 
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be the ‘idea’ that Julián ‘has’. (pp. 15-18) I can read that ‘Julián’ is known as such when he 
‘is a mermaid’ (cover and ‘final illustration’) but there is known to be an ‘I’ in ‘Nana, I am 
also a mermaid’ (p. 13), where, as with Julián, the ‘I’ is known to be both different to a 
mermaid and in excess of the mermaid in being known to claim that ‘I’ is ‘also a mermaid’. 
In ‘(a)ll he can think of is becoming a mermaid himself’ (back cover blurb), there is known to 
be a ‘he’ that ‘can think (…) of himself’ ‘becoming a mermaid’, so that not only is ‘he’ 
known not to be a mermaid but ‘himself’ also remains different from ‘a mermaid’: ‘a 
mermaid’ is something that it is known ‘he’ knows ‘himself’ can ‘become’, but is not, just as 
being a mermaid is something that ‘I am also’. 
 I have offered here, necessarily, only sections of readings of Julián is Mermaid and 
some of its reviews, but my interest has been to demonstrate how and why psychoanalytic 
and deconstructive readings cannot tell you what children, humans, animals or mermaids 
(or anyone/ thing) are, think, see, imagine, dream, feel or love – or even to believe this is 
an aim that can and should be achieved – but instead read what is at stake for perspectives 
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